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For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed practical 
solutions to the world’s greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars 
continue to provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decision makers 
chart a course toward a better world. 
 
CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 
full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and 
develop policy initiatives that look to the future and anticipate change. 
 
Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and 
prosperity as a force for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the world’s 
preeminent international policy institutions focused on Defense and security; regional stability; 
and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and 
economic integration. 
 
Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. John J. 
Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in April 2000. CSIS was 
founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke.  
 
CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed in this presentation 
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For the past decade, the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) has analyzed trends in government contracting in general, and defense 
contracting specifically, using publicly available data. This research effort, performed for the Department 
of Defense (DoD), focuses on effective competition for defense contracts. CSIS believes that examining 
effective competition, as distinct from measures of competition generally, is the best metric to measure 
whether the Department of Defense is successfully promoting competition. Effective competition 
excludes competitively sourced contracts that receive only one offer. 
Numerous statements from officials inside DoD and throughout the federal government have 
emphasized the importance of promoting competition, particularly in a difficult budget environment, as 
a way to improve quality and reduce cost. This research effort focuses on the generation of a predictive 
model for effective competition rates within defense contracting. The purpose of the model described in 
this paper is to better understand the extent to which different factors in defense contracting influence 
effective competition in the bidding process. By comparing the model's prediction of how different 
factors influence achieving effective competition, the model can then be used to identify possible 
weaknesses in DoD contracting and in the industrial base. This effort is an important addition to the 
literature on defense competition, as it quantifies the correlative effects of different factors through a 
statistically rigorous analysis. 
Earlier under this research effort, the study team reported on levels of effective competition for the 
military departments, and then disaggregated the effective competition rates for products, services, and 
research & development (R&D).1 This approach uses trend analysis to determine whether rates are 
improving or degrading under Better Buying Power and during sequestration and its aftermath. The 
larger study analyzes competition via a range of approaches. The study team found that, while recent 
reports from the Government Accountability Office found reduced competition overall, effective 
competition rates have held steady in aggregate despite the pressures of sequestration. The team also 
found that while rates of effective competition for products, services, and R&D have been remarkably 
consistent over time for DoD as a whole, those rates differ significantly between major DoD 
components. In particular, there are notable differences between the major DoD components in rates of 
effective competition for similar categories of products, services, and R&D, which is discussed in some 
detail in Section I of this report. 
The primary focus of this study is on competition for defense contracts at the levels of Major 
Contracting Commands (MCCs) and U.S. states (as place of performance). By aggregating the data at this 
deeper level, the study team can look for signs of weakness in the industrial base on both a geographical 
and functional basis. Additionally, the study team believes that examining rates of effective competition 
at the MCC level can help identify those MCCs that are either particularly effective or less effective than 
average at getting competition for certain categories of products, services, and R&D. The utility of this 
                                                          





study will be to go beyond obvious findings, such as low levels of competition for complex defense 
specific systems, and to instead look at which states and Major Commands are over- or 
underperforming expectations.  
CSIS found that it was first necessary to set a baseline of what to expect. To do so, this paper first 
examines trends in competition for defense contracts for DoD overall, by major DoD component, and by 
various taxonomies of what DoD contracts for. This analysis provides context for the analysis that 
follows, by allowing the study team to understand what levels of competition should be expected for 
different elements of the DoD contracting portfolio. 
The second section of this study examines the relationship between a variety of contract characteristics 
and the level of competition through the number of offers, at both the state and MCC levels. Based on 
past experience analyzing competition for defense contracts, the study team identified variables that 
might correlate with higher or lower levels of effective competition. This analysis guides the decision of 
which variables have sufficient predictive power to be included in the state and/or MCC predictive 
models. The evaluated characteristics include: 
 Contracting Methods: Fixed-Price, Indefinite Delivery Vehicles, Multiple Award Indefinite 
Delivery Contracts (IDCs), and Single-Award IDCs. 
 Product or Service Categories: Services, Aircraft, Engines and Power Plants, Ground Vehicles, 
Missiles and Space, Ships, “Other Products,” Facilities-Related Services and Construction, and 
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services. 
 Platform Portfolios: Aircraft and Drones, Electronics and Communications, Land Vehicles, 
Missiles and Space, Ships and Submarines, and Weapons and Ammunition. 
After examining the influence of contract characteristics on effective competition in isolation, CSIS 
proceeded to study this relationship using the same units of analyses as the first phase: states and 
MCCs. For each geographical and organizational unit, the study team calculated the percentage of 
obligations that aligned with each contract characteristic using a denominator of constant obligations 
from FY2000 to FY2013. The study team then used the variables identified in the previous section in a 
regression model to generate predictions of 2014 effective competition rates, and compared those 
“estimates” rates to actual 2014 effective competition rates. The study team then examined particular 
states and MCCs with interesting results, to determine why the models were or were not able to 
generate accurate predictions. 
In examining why the predictive models over- or underestimated effective competition rates for 
particular states or MCCs, the study team discovered that there are major discrepancies in rates of 
effective competition within different categories of the DoD contracting portfolio between states and 
between MCCs. Those states and those MCCs who have higher- or lower-than-average rates of effective 
competition for particular categories of the DoD contracting portfolio warrant further analysis, to 
determine whether the difference is the result of practices that can either serve as lessons learned or 
possible areas for improvement. In this regard, the study team believes that this analysis serves as a 




example through the Department's highly detailed Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) initiative, or as a 
means for targeting analysis of competition-related practices at certain contracting commands. 
Literature Review 
Competition in the defense acquisition system is widely advocated within both government and 
industry, and it remains a major thrust of policy directives issued by both Congress and departmental 
leadership. This literature review seeks to address several important topics that are shaping the current 
competition discussion by identifying the key findings from, and limitations of, existing analytical 
literature on competition in defense acquisition. By examining research studies and government reports, 
the review will focus on DoD’s recent competition-related promotion and reform efforts since 2000, 
findings on the advantages and drawbacks of competition in different phases of the acquisition process, 
and various factors that the literature identifies as influencing levels of competition, including who is 
awarding the contracts and what type of system is being acquired.  
Current State of the Academic Literature on Defense Competition 
Much of the literature that does exist on defense competition is from government oversight sources, 
such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS), or from 
official DoD reports like the annual competition report. These reports mostly focus on competition at a 
high level (DoD overall, or by major DoD component), or, where they deal with competition in more 
specificity, primarily focus on competition for high-profile weapons systems that qualify as Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The focus on MDAPs is also prevalent in the non-governmental 
literature 
While it is understandable that MDAPs would attract the most attention, focusing entirely on high-
profile weapons platforms ignores large portions of the DoD contracting portfolio. Critically, these other 
portions are both the most competitive and also where commercial practices are most likely to be 
relevant. There is minimal literature discussing the issues particular to competition for DoD services 
contracts, which accounted for a plurality (46 percent, excluding R&D contracts) of overall DoD contract 
obligations in 2014. And, while MDAPs accounted for a significant share of overall DoD products 
contract obligations in 2014, over half of the obligations awarded for DoD products were for non-
MDAPs. Past work by CSIS on competition for DoD contracts has attempted to provide a quantitative 
analysis of competition for the full range of the DoD contracting portfolio. This study represents a 
continuation of that effort. 
Recent DoD Efforts to Promote Competition 
DoD regards competition as a viable tool to bring some of the efficiencies of free market into 
government investments and service procurement. Accordingly, current Pentagon leadership regularly 
emphasizes the need to introduce and maintain competition within the acquisition process. In the 
recently published “Guidelines for Creating and Maintaining a Competitive Environment for Supplies and 
Services” DoD leadership implores its contracting officers to embrace competition “because it works. 




performance.”2 To various degrees, competition has been a policy objective of the U.S. government for 
decades.  
The use of competition in weapon systems acquisition is widely advocated in policy statements, 
anchored in statute, and supported by the rules and regulations issued by both Administration officials 
and DoD. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 requires U.S. federal government agencies 
to arrange for competition in their procurement activities subject to a short list of exceptions unless 
otherwise authorized by law.3 Under CICA, competition can include competing bids “after exclusion of 
sources,” such as when agencies engage in set-aside acquisitions for small businesses.4 The theory 
behind the legislation was that more competition would reduce costs and improve performance. 
Competition after excluding sources was intended to ensure access to the vibrancy and innovative 
capacity of small businesses in Federal contracting.  
In more recent years, pressure for competition has increased from both the executive and the legislative 
branches. The White House was intent on reforming the acquisition marketplace by checking schedule 
slippages, encouraging the use of fixed-price contracts, and promoting competition. On March 2009, 
President Obama signed a Memorandum that directed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to 
develop and issue government-wide guidance, inter alia, that promotes the optimal “use of full and 
open competition and other competitive procurement processes.”5  
Congress, which has been very much concerned with cost, waste, and schedule issues in the acquisition 
system, followed up by passing the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) on May 22, 2009, 
which directed the Department of Defense to develop and implement measures that encourage greater 
efficiency and better performance by Defense vendors, as well as more competition during the 
acquisition process. Section 202 of this law requires the development of competitive acquisition 
strategies using one or more of several approaches such as prototyping, dual-sourcing, funding of a 
second source for next generation technology, utilization of open architectures to ensure competition 
for upgrades, periodic competitions for subsystem upgrades, and licensing of additional suppliers.6 In 
response to the President’s directive in October 2009, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in OMB 
published its guidance to federal acquisition officials that summarized the steps that departments and 
agencies should take to increase competition and improve the structure of contracts.7  
                                                          
2 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “Guidelines for Creating and 
Maintaining a Competitive Environment for Supplies and Services in the Department of Defense,” 2014, 1. 
3 The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369, 
§§ 2701-2753, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984). It amended the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947; Federal Property 
and Administrative Services Act of 1949; Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974; and Truth in 
Negotiation Act (TINA) of 1962. It also created a statutory basis for the bid-protest function of the GAO. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, Subject: Government Contracting,” 2009. 
6 Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, P.L. 111-123, §§ 202, 123 Stat. 1720 (2009). 
7 Office of Federal Procurement Policy, “Memorandum for Chief Acquisition Officers, Senior Procurement 





Following in the wake of these measures, in June 2010, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Ashton 
Carter introduced the first iteration of Better Buying Power (BBP 1.0). BBP 1.0, which was part of a 
broader DoD Efficiency Initiative, sought to “deliver warfighting capabilities needed within the 
constraints of a declining defense budget by achieving better buying power for the Warfighters and 
taxpayer.” One of the core elements of this strategy was to promote competition. Accordingly, Under 
Secretary Carter directed DoD to “avoid directed buys and other substitutes for real competition” and to 
“use technical data packages and open systems architectures to support a continuous competitive 
environment.” Additionally, the initiative emphasized the importance of increasing small business 
participation in defense.8 
In November 2012, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Frank Kendall introduced the second iteration of 
Better Buying Power, BBP 2.0, which continued to build on efforts to promote effective competition. In 
order to support this effort, BPP 2.0 further detailed the importance of the following: 1) promoting 
competition strategic and environments; 2) enforcing open system architectures and effectively 
managing technical data rights; and 3) increasing small business roles and opportunities. BBP 2.0 also 
identified the “use of the Technology Development phase for true risk reduction” as an important step 
in promoting effective competition. 9 
The third iteration of Better Buying Power, BBP 3.0, was officially introduced in April 2015 and provided 
the most detailed BBP directive for promoting competition, with both general guidance and specific 
actions. In addition to the familiar support for creating competitive environments and increasing small 
business participation, BBP 3.0 sought to “improve DoD outreach for technology products from global 
markets.” Recognizing that a significant source of innovation now came from beyond the U.S., BBP 3.0 
emphasized the importance of “establishing a centralized process that integrates and provides 
awareness of global technology” as a way of continuing to improve competition for DoD acquisitions. 10  
What are the Costs and Benefits of Competition? 
Understanding the benefits and costs of competition is key to predicting where it is more or less likely to 
occur. The basic argument for competition in defense procurement is that it reduces the cost of 
purchasing goods and services. Advocates of competition point to significant benefits. These benefits 
                                                          
8 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “Memorandum for Acquisition 
Professionals, Subject: Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense 
Spending,” 2010. 
9 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “Memorandum for Defense 
Acquisition Workforce, Subject: Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending,” 2012. 
10 Honorable Frank Kendall, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
“Better Buying Power 3.0 Interim Release,” 2014. See also Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics. Guidelines for Creating and Maintaining a Competitive Environment for Supplies and 




are summarized in DoD’s Guidelines for Creating and Maintaining a Competitive Environment for 
Supplies and Services in the Department of Defense11: 
1. Competition creates an incentive for contractors to provide goods and services at 
a lower price (economic efficiency);  
2. Competition spurs innovation of transformational technologies, which allows the 
Department to field the best weapon systems for our warfighters quickly;12  
3. Competition yields improvements in the quality of products delivered and services 
rendered (firms that turn out low quality are driven out of the market and are unable 
to effectively compete);13  
4. Competition affords the Department the opportunity to acquire performance 
improvements (e.g., faster, lighter, more sustainable) by using “best value” source 
selection criteria;14  
5. Competition provides opportunities for capable small businesses to enter new 
markets;  
6. Competition enhances (or maintains) a strong defense industrial base which 
provides an operational surge capability to handle demand spikes, and;  
7. Competition curbs fraud by creating opportunities to re-assess sources of goods 
and services reinforcing the public trust and confidence in the transparency of the 
Defense Acquisition System. 
Scott Chandler echoes these views, asserting that competition is a “powerful tool for achieving cost 
effective acquisition,” for it “encourages research and innovation; new services, products and uses; and 
increase quality, reliability and performance from suppliers.”15 However, he also expresses skepticism 
about current efforts and argues that DoD is failing to meet competition goals because it is unable to 
attract sufficient vendors. However, Jesse Ellman has shown that much of the decline discussed in 
Chandler’s piece can be attributed to a decline in competition with only a single offer.16 The decline in 
obligations for contracts that received only one offer shows that while DoD places great emphasis on 
competition, contracting officers have at least partially adopted the view of Arena and Birkler of RAND: 
                                                          
11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “Guidelines for Creating and 
Maintaining a Competitive Environment for Supplies and Services in the Department of Defense,” 2014. 
12 Jacques S. Gansler, William Lucyshyn, and Michael Arendt, “Competition in Defense Acquisitions,” University of 
Maryland Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, 2009, 2. 
13 Ibid., 4. 
14 Ibid., 5. 
15 Scott E. Chandler, “Rethinking Competition in Defense Acquisition,” Lexington Institute, 2014, 1. 
16 Jesse Ellman, “Quality of Competition for Defense Contracts under ‘Better Buying Power’,” Center for Strategic 




“in some cases (especially in the procurement of major systems where the nonrecurring cost is large) it 
may be less costly for the government to forgo competition and to rely on a single supplier.”17 Given the 
range of benefits discussed above, why should it be the case that sometimes a sole source is cheaper? 
The most straightforward answer is that due to the high technology and the defense-specific nature of 
many products and services acquired by DoD, there is often only one qualified offeror available. Beyond 
that, competition does have transaction costs. If the contracting officer is satisfied that they already 
have one reliable supplier, then the additional effort required to develop transparent and fair 
competitive criteria, the labor required to evaluate the qualifications of any additional producer, and the 
caution required to avoid bid protests all may prompt hesitation. All three of these factors also have a 
cost in time, which is particularly troubling during ongoing operations. In addition, the listed costs are all 
apparent in the short run, while the benefits of competition are often more uncertain and, in some 
cases, would only occur after the contracting officer has likely moved on to a new post.18  
Competition can also result in problems on the vendor-side, if vendors make unrealistically low offers in 
an effort to win. Joachim Hofbauer et al. found evidence of this phenomenon in a paper that examined 
costs overruns in 92 active and 12 cancelled MDAP programs. They found that “perhaps surprisingly, full 
and open competition with multiple bidders performs on average worse than no or unclear 
competition.”19 This result did not hold when multiple offers were received after the exclusion of 
possible sources. The authors found additional evidence suggesting that unrealistic cost estimates were 
to blame. “Based on the SAR’s data, this can be attributed to full and open competition with multiple 
bidders having the highest percentage of estimating variance of any of the categories.”20  
Allen Friar drew on the Hofbauer study, along with four others, to reach a broader conclusion: “The 
ability of competition to help control cost is limited to the ability of the government to adequately 
define and price their requirement based on the capabilities that exist in the market place. If the 
required technology doesn’t really exist or if only one source can potentially provide the item or service 
then competition can’t even help control the initial cost let alone the final cost.”21 
There is no single, clear answer from the literature reviewed as to whether DoD use of competition is 
effective and to what extent additional competition would result in better acquisition results. However, 
the principles of when competition will be most effective and when it will be costly are less 
controversial, even as specific cases are hotly contested. 
                                                          
17  Mark V. Arena and John Birkler, “Determining When Competition Is a Reasonable Strategy for the Production 
Phase of Defense Acquisition,” RAND Corporation, 2009, 1. 
18 Ibid., 12.  
19 Joachim Hofbauer, Gregory Sanders, Jesse Ellman, David Morrow, “Cost and Time Overruns for Major Defense 
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Differences in Contracting Practices Based on Who is Doing the Contracting 
Competition in DoD acquisition is also a function of the singular role that government plays in the 
acquisition marketplace. Within the commercial marketplace, market participants share certain 
characteristics: they generally offer similar goods and services that can be substituted for one another. 
In contrast, the government acquisition market is defined by vendors who share an ability to do business 
with a single customer—the government—but offer unique, high technology products and typically 
compete on a “winner takes all” basis.22 The defense acquisition market is distinctive in that the DoD is 
not only often the sole buyer of goods from certain firms but also directly involved in regulating the 
market itself.  
While the defense market is considered to be a monopsony market, with the government as the sole 
buyer, the DoD’s market power–its ability to affect the market price of purchased goods—is not 
unlimited. The DoD is not a unitary buyer; rather, it constitutes many program offices that function as 
the actual customers of defense firms. In this sense, a monopsony model may not be an accurate lens 
for looking at the defense industry.23 Still, the emphasis on joint programs and common acquisition 
policies regulations over the past several decades allows DoD some of the advantages of a monopsony 
customer.24 
Looking beyond DoD as a unitary entity, previous CSIS analysis of trends in defense competition has 
shown significant variation in rates of competition between the different major DoD components. Since 
2008, Army contract obligations have been competed at a rate near or higher than the rate for overall 
DoD contract obligations, while the rates of competition for the Navy and Air Force have been 
significantly lower than for overall DoD and have, additionally, been declining. Within the major DoD 
components, there are also significant differences in rates of competition for different areas of the 
defense contracting portfolio; in the Air Force, for example, the rate of competition for services was 
more than 20 percentage points below the rate for overall DoD services.25 
See Section 1 of this study for more discussion of differences in competition for defense contracts based 
on the DoD component that is doing the contracting. 
Differences in Competition Based on What is Being Acquired 
While much of existing literature focuses on products, particularly weapon systems, the acquisition of 
services does play a substantial role in the total DoD acquisition regime. CSIS analysis shows that 
contract obligations for services have accounted for the largest share of overall DoD contract obligations 
in every year since 2009, and were consistently nearly equal to the share awarded for products since at 
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least 2000. The services DoD buys represent a wide range of deliverables; some, such as lawn care, can 
be effectively sourced from the commercial market, while others such as science, engineering, and 
technical advising services often require defense domain-specific expertise.  
Recent acquisition reform efforts have emphasized a desire to manage services as aggressively as high 
value weapon systems. Whereas weapons systems programs attract senior level management 
involvement and oversight, services generally do not exhibit corresponding management involvement or 
oversight. 26 In practice, services contracts have higher rates of competition than contracts for R&D or 
products.27  
Competition in the Defense Contracting Portfolio 
Using data from the publicly-available Federal Procurement Data Systems (FPDS), CSIS has conducted 
extensive analysis on trends in competition for defense contracts. One of the main findings has been 
that overall DoD competition rates, which have been largely steady in recent years, mask significant 
differences in rates of competition in different areas of the defense contracting portfolio. The rate of 
effective competition for defense services has consistently remained near two-thirds since the mid-
2000s, while the rate of competition for defense products has remained near one-third over that same 
period. 28 
Even within products and services, there are significant differences in rates of competition between 
different categories of products and services. As discussed in Section 1 of this report, two categories of 
services (medical services and facilities-related services & construction) have seen rates of competition 
consistently higher than the rates for overall DoD services since 2000, while the other three categories 
have seen rates consistently lower over that same period. Similarly, the categories of products that are 
primarily comprised of platforms, systems, and subsystems have mostly seen rates of effective 
competition lower than the (already low) rate of competition for overall DoD products, while the rate 
for categories primarily composed of commodities and commercial goods has consistently exceeded the 
overall DoD products rate. 
See Section 1 of this study for a more detailed discussion of differences in the competitiveness of 
different areas of the defense contracting portfolio.  
Competition in Production for Weapon Systems 
While the government has a clearly stated preference for competition when available, the government 
is often reliant on the original developers for long periods of time when it comes to producing weapon 
systems. In some cases, due to extraordinary requirements, there may have been only one developer 
available when a project was first started. In other cases, multiple vendors were available, but the 
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government chose only one winner and did not take on the costs necessary (in terms of dual-sourcing or 
acquiring full technical data rights) to allow other vendors to participate in the production phase.29 
According to Area and Birkler, “at almost every phase in the acquisition cycle and for almost every kind 
of competition, adding a second competitor requires current-year investment above what a sole-source 
would cost. During the planning phase, such funds are relatively small in absolute terms. However, when 
the program moves to the production phase, the magnitude of the funding required for a second, 
competitive source becomes large relative to program costs and in absolute terms, reaching tens or 
hundreds of millions of dollars.”30 The amount of time it takes to authorize a second production source, 
along with the resulting risk of extending program length, can lead to these raised program costs. 
Adding contractors to the program increases the amount of overall work for the program office, 
especially when the contracts are cost-based rather than fixed-price.31 Justifying the up front cost of 
competition, therefore, can be challenging for DoD . Even after arranging funding, money for 
competitive programs is a prime target in a budget squeeze, and initial high-level support for 
competition may evaporate.  
RAND’s 2009 report, “Determining When Competition Is a Reasonable Strategy for the Production Phase 
of Defense Acquisition,” offers a contemporary examination of cases in which the government might opt 
for competition during the production phase of the procurement process. Previous research on this 
topic had been largely inconclusive, in part because the different analytical methods used to estimate 
the cost benefits of competition in production can yield drastically different results, even when 
analyzing the same data. A 1981 RAND study32 utilizing several analytic tools to estimate the cost benefit 
of a second production source in the development of the Shillelagh missile, for example, showed that 
the tools’ estimates ranged from a cost savings of 79 percent to a cost increase of 14 percent. Moreover, 
cost reductions caused specifically by the introduction of competition or the use of a second producer in 
the production phase of procurement can be extremely difficult to isolate and quantify, as they are 
frequently camouflaged by other program factors.33 
Using historical data collected from previous RAND studies and RAND’s required cost reduction (RCR) 
methodology, the authors in the 2009 report developed a model that estimates the likelihood that the 
government would break even if it were to introduce and invest in a competitive second producer. This 
model furthermore determines whether the cost reductions achieved by the inclusion of a second 
producer would outweigh the costs of bringing that second source into the weapons program by 
                                                          
29 K.A. Archibald, A.J. Harman et al. “Factors Affecting the Use of Competition in Weapon System Acquisition,” 
RAND Corporation, 1981. 
30 Mark V. Arena and John Birkler, “Determining When Competition Is a Reasonable Strategy for the Production 
Phase of Defense Acquisition,” RAND Corporation, 2009, 9. 
31 Ibid. 
32 K.A. Archibald, A.J. Harman et al. “Factors Affecting the Use of Competition in Weapon System Acquisition,” 
RAND Corporation, 1981. 
33 Mark V. Arena and John Birkler, “Determining When Competition Is a Reasonable Strategy for the Production 




calculating the percentage of savings in the production phase that would be needed to offset the 
incremental investment of a second competitive producer.  
Applying the model to several high-profile acquisition programs, the authors found that the type of 
system being developed influences whether, and how much, a second competitor achieves a cost 
savings for DoD. Specifically, second producers of electronics have been more likely to achieve 
production cost savings than second producers of ships and missiles. Additionally, their research 
suggests that competition “is more reasonable in situations where both nonrecurring costs are low and 
cost improvement is minimal,” “where a greater number of units will be produced,” and where “there is 
at least a 50-50 chance of achieving savings.”34  
Focus Areas Supported by the Literature Review 
Existing literature provides a firm grounding for using a product or platform type as key criteria when 
predicting levels of expected competition. Past CSIS research clearly establishes that the prevalence of 
competition varies greatly based on what is being purchased.35 This unsurprising result reflects the fact 
that defense firms are often highly specialized and only one vendor is available for many major projects. 
RAND’s 2009 work shows that these variable competition rates not only reflect the number of available 
vendors but also the contracting officers’ determination as to whether a second competitor would be 
worth the cost.  
Building upon this foundation, this study digs more deeply into available data on competition for DoD 
contracts. Instead of focusing on competition for DoD overall, or competition for the major DoD 
components, this study looks at competition at the MCC level as well as by place of performance (at the 
U.S. state level). In this way, the study team is expanding the breadth of the literature on defense 
competition by continuing to build evidence that trends in defense competition are driven not at the 
overall DoD or even major component level, but rather by decisions at lower levels, differences in the 
strength of the industrial bases in different areas of the country, and variations in how different MCCs 
approach utilizing competition in their own contracting portfolios. 
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I. Overall Defense Competition Trends 
Over the past decade, CSIS has done extensive work tracking trends in competition for defense 
contracts, for DoD overall, for its major components, and by category of what is being contracted for 
delivery. While this analysis intends to dive a level deeper into the data on defense competition, some 
discussion of overall competition trends can provide important context for the analysis that follows.  
The study team follows the DoD methodology and calculates competition by using two fields: extent of 
competition (which is preferred for awards) and fair opportunity (which is preferred for most IDVs). 
Additionally, to better evaluate the rate of “effective competition,” the study team categorizes 
competitively awarded contracts by the number of offers received. As mentioned in the introduction, 
CSIS considers “effective competition” to be competitively sourced contracts that are awarded after 
receiving two or more offers; the study team considers it likely that competitively sourced contracts that 
receive only one offer are not receiving the full intended benefits of competition. While competitive 
pressures can and frequently do exist even in contracting scenarios involving less than two offers, the 
existence of at least two offers still represents a reasonable baseline standard for assessing the degree 
to which the full benefits intended as a result of the policy preference for competition are likely to be 
achieved. 
Overall DoD 
Figure 1-1 shows trends in competition for overall DoD contract obligations between 2000 and 2014. 
Figure 1-1: Overall Defense Contract Obligations by Level of Competition, 2000–2014 
 




As the figure shows, the rate of effective competition for defense contracts has been remarkably 
consistent in the 2000–2014 period, remaining between 49 percent and 51 percent in every year since 
2005, and never falling below 45 percent or exceeding 51 percent. The overall level of competition for 
DoD contract obligations has remained largely unchanged, despite consistent high-level policy efforts in 
recent years to increase competition in defense contracting. Within those effectively competed contract 
obligations, however, there has been a modest, but notable shift: in 2000, the largest share of 
effectively competed contracts was awarded after receiving two offers, but by 2007 and in every year 
since, the largest share was awarded with 5+ offers. So while the overall share of contract obligations 
awarded after effective competition has not increased, there is some evidence that the quality of that 
competition (as measured by number of offers received) has increased somewhat. 
The share of contract obligations awarded after competition with a single offer has declined significantly 
in recent years, from 11 percent in 2010 to 7 percent in 2013 and 2014, in line with recent DoD guidance 
to reduce the instances of competitively sourced contracts awarded after receiving only one offer. 
While trends in competition for DoD overall have been fairly consistent, this obscures significant 
differences in levels of competition between the major DoD components and differences based on what 
is being contracted for delivery. The sections that follow will examine those differences in some detail. 
By Major DoD Component 
Figure 1-2 shows the rate of effective competition for defense contracts, broken down by major DoD 
component: Army, Navy, Air Force, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and “Other DoD,” which includes 
all other contracting offices not captured by the first four categories. 
Figure 1-2: Rate of Effective Competition for Defense Contract Obligations, by Component, 2000–2014 




As the figure shows, there are major differences in the rates of effective competition between the major 
DoD components. Both the Navy and the Air Force have seen rates of effective competition well below 
the rate for overall DoD throughout the period observed. The rate of effective competition for Navy 
contract obligations hovered near 40 percent for most of the 2000s, but has declined since, reaching a 
low of 34 percent in 2013. The rate of effective competition for Air Force contract obligations was 46 
percent in 2000, but declined precipitously in the early 2000s, hovering around 40 percent throughout 
the 2000s and the first years of the 2010s, declining sharply to 32 percent by 2012. The Air Force 
effective competition rate has rebounded somewhat over the last two years, however, rising to 38 
percent by 2014. The low rates of effective competition for both the Navy and the Air Force are not 
surprising, given the relatively limited industrial bases for both aircraft and ships, and the number of 
large programs in production (where competition is rare for major weapons platforms) in both services. 
By contrast, both DLA and “Other DoD” have seen consistently high rates of effective competition; the 
contracting inventories of both DLA and “Other DoD” are primarily composed of commodities and 
commercial goods, so it makes sense that both would see high levels of competition. The Army, 
meanwhile, has seen rates of effective competition that track closely with the rate for overall DoD 
contract obligations; the Army’s contracting inventory includes more large, complex platforms and 
systems than either DLA or “Other DoD,” but the industrial base supporting those platforms and systems 
is generally more robust than for the largest Navy and Air Force programs. 
By Products, Services, and Research & Development 
Figure 1-3 shows the rate of effective competition for DoD contract obligations, broken down by what is 
being contracted for delivery: products, services, and research and development (R&D), as categorized 





Figure 1-3: Rate of Effective Competition for Defense Contract Obligations, by Products, Services, and 
R&D, 2000–2014 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis 
Much like effective competition for overall DoD contract obligations, the rates of effective competition 
for products, services, and R&D have been largely stable over the 2000–2014 period. The rate of 
effective competition for products has hovered near or slightly above one-third for most of the period 
observed, while the rate of effective competition for services, which fluctuated near 60 percent for most 
of the early to mid-2000s, has remained between 66 percent and 67 percent in every year since 2008. 
R&D, meanwhile, has seen rates of effective competition roughly in line with the rate for overall DoD 
contract obligations. 
This broad stability in rates of effective competition for the three categories of what DoD contracts for, 
despite significant shifts in what DoD was buying over the period, speaks to broader issues that 
influence how much competition DoD contracts receive. The study team has done some work on this 
issue previously, identifying notable differences in the rates of effective competition for products, 
services, and R&D among the major DoD components.36 The study team believes that any real 
conclusions about how to improve competition for DoD contracts will come from even more granular 
breakdowns of defense competition data; this research effort represents a significant step forward in 
that effort. 





By Product or Service Category 
Over the course of prior and current research efforts, the CSIS research team has developed taxonomies 
of defense contracts, breaking down the overall defense contracting portfolio into categories based on 
what is being contracted for delivery. The primary taxonomy that the study team uses is based upon 
government PSCs, and divides defense contracts into five categories of services and 10 categories of 
products, plus R&D. The following charts will show trends in the rates of effective competition for these 
product and service categories. 
Services Categories 
DoD’s services contracting portfolio is divided into five service categories: 
 Equipment-related Services (ERS) 
 Facilities-related Services & Construction (FRS&C) 
 Information and Communications Technology (ICT) services 
 Medical (MED) services 
 Professional, Administrative, and Management Support (PAMS) services 
Figure 1-4 shows the rates of effective competition for services contracts in each of these five 
categories. 
Figure 1-4: Rate of Effective Competition for Defense Services Contract Obligations, by Services 
Category, 2000–2014 




ERS, ICT, and PAMS all have seen roughly similar levels of effective competition through most of the 
period, fluctuating between 50 percent and 60 percent, consistently below the rate of effective 
competition for overall defense services. Meanwhile, FRS&C and MED have both experienced rates of 
effective competition significantly higher than overall defense services. 
Products Categories37 
DoD’s products contracting portfolio is divided into 10 products categories: 
 Aircraft 
 Clothing & Subsistence (C&S) 
 Electronics & Communications (E&C) 
 Engines & Power Plants (E&PP) 
 Fuels 
 Ground Vehicles 
 Launchers & Munitions (L&M) 
 Missiles & Space 
 Ships 
 “Other Products” 
Figures 1-5 shows the rates of effective competition for services contracts in each of these 10 
categories. For ease of comprehension, the 10 categories are split across three charts, with the dotted 
line showing the rate of effective competition for overall DoD products for context in each chart. 
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Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis 
The first chart of Figure 1-5 shows the four product categories that are primarily composed of major 
defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). Unsurprisingly, given the technical complexity of these 
programs and the limited industrial base capable of executing them, the rates of effective competition 
are quite low. Aircraft and Missiles & Space, in particular, have seen rates of effective competition far 
below that of overall DoD products, and those rates have declined over the period observed. The rate of 
effective competition for Ships, meanwhile, has risen significantly in recent years, from below 20 
percent from 2006–2009 to 32 percent in 2013. This is likely the result of deliberate decisions to split the 
procurement of certain high-cost platforms, such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Aegis-class 
destroyers, between two competing shipyards. 
The second chart of Figure 1-5 shows effective competition rates for the product categories that are 
primarily composed of systems and subsystems. The rate of effective competition for E&C remained 
around one-third through the early and mid-2000s, but has risen since, hovering just below 40 percent 
in most years since 2007. The relatively low rate of effective competition for E&C is somewhat 
surprising, but it may be a reflection of the barriers to entry for tech firms that are not traditional 
defense vendors. Competition with a single offer is a particular challenge in this product category; nearly 
a quarter of all E&C contract obligations were awarded after competition with only one offer in 2005, 
and though that rate has declined in recent years, 15 percent of E&C contract obligations in 2014 were 
awarded after competition with only one offer.  
The third chart of Figure 1-5 shows effective competition rates for the product categories that are 
primarily composed of commodities and commercial goods. Fuels and C&S have seen high rates of 
effective competition, as would be expected, but the rate of effective competition for “Other Products” 




single-offer competition remains an issue for “Other Products,” with 14 percent of total obligations 
awarded after competition with only one offer from 2012–2014.  
By Platform Portfolio 
CSIS has developed platform portfolios as another schema for categorizing defense contract obligations 
based on what is being contracted for delivery. The base concept of this taxonomy is to focus on types 
of platforms, and then group together all product, service, and R&D contracts that can be linked to 
those programs, using both government PSCs and another FPDS field, ClaimantProgramCode. There are 
10 total platform portfolio categories: 
 Aircraft & Drones 
 Electronics & Communications 
 Land Vehicles 
 Missile & Space Systems 
 Ships & Submarines 
 Weapons & Ammunition 
 Facilities & Construction 
 Other Products 
 Other R&D & Knowledge Based  
 Other Services 
Figure 1-6 shows rates of effective competition for the 10 platform portfolio categories from 2000–
2014. For ease of comprehension, the 10 categories have been divided between two charts within the 
figure, with the dashed line representing the rate of effective competition for overall DoD contracts in 









Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis. 
The first chart of Figure 1-6 shows the rates of effective competition for the five platform portfolios 




their related product categories. Aircraft & Drones and Missiles & Space have consistently seen among 
the lowest rates of effective competition, with those rates declining further over recent years. And as 
with the Ships products category, the rate of effective competition for the Ships & Submarines platform 
portfolio has seen a marked increase in recent years, from 21 percent in 2008 to 38 percent in 2013.  
The second chart of Figure 1-6 shows the rates of effective competition for the remaining five platform 
portfolios. 
Final Thoughts on Overall DoD Competition Trends 
This section provides context for competition trends across the range of who is contracting within DoD 
and what is being contracted for delivery. In particular, as discussed in the next section, many of the 
product and service categories and platform portfolios were evaluated for use as variables in the 
predictive model that forms the core of this research effort. Knowing the degree of effective 
competition for those categories and portfolios will allow the study team to better understand why a 
particular state or MCC over- or underperforms its “estimated” rate of effective competition within the 
model. The overall competition trends therefore help establish a baseline for comparison as context for 






This section examines the range of variables the CSIS study team considered and evaluated for inclusion 
in a predictive model of effective competition. CSIS utilized its experience in evaluating trends in defense 
contracting to identify variables that might reasonably be assumed to correlate with higher or lower 
rates of effective competition. The study team then performed a regression analysis on each variable 
with Effective Competition (the dependent variable for this study) in order to determine both the 
presence and direction of a correlative relationship. This analysis was done for the two contracting data 
groupings that this research effort focuses on: 
 Place of Performance - States: This breakdown examines in which state a contract is to be 
performed. This is done by using each state as an observation and aggregating the data from 
each state for each variable over the period from 2000 to 2013. This can provide indications of 
the vibrancy of the industrial base available to perform contracts activity within a particular 
state.38 
 Major Contracting Command (MCC): Going a level below the analytic level of “component,” this 
breakdown allows for analysis of how successful different major contracting commands have 
been in promoting effective competition relative to the goods or services for which they are 
contracting and the types of contracts for which they are responsible. This is done by using each 
MCC as an observation and aggregating the data from each MCC for each variable over the 
period from 2000 to 2013. 
For each variable considered, this section will provide a brief description, an analysis of the distribution 
of contract obligations with that variable among the MCCs and states, and the relationship between that 
variable and effective competition. The variables are divided into four categories: 
 Dependent Variable 
 Contract Characteristics 
 Product or Service Categories 
 Platform Portfolios 
Dependent Variable 
Effective Competition 
Effective competition, defined as the total obligated value of all competitively sourced contracts that 
received two or more offers divided by the total obligated value of all contracts, is the measure of value 
that this study uses to estimate effective competition in defense contracting. As the study team’s 
dependent variable, the following analyses use the collected data to estimate how different 
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characteristics of defense contracting affect effective competition. Before defining the model, effective 
competition and the other variables estimated to impact effective competition will be examined in order 
to understand the magnitude of the relationships and robustness of the model.  
As seen in the previous section, there are significant variations in rates of effective competition based 
on both what components within DoD are doing the contracting, and based on what is being contracted 
for delivery. A core assumption of this research effort is that there is some level of disparity in rates of 
effective competition between different states and different MCCs. Figure2-1 displays the distribution of 
effective competition at the MCC level and at the state level.  
Figure 2-1: Distribution of Effectively Competed Contracts, by MCC and Place of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution of the effective competition rate is skewed to the right with a mean of 
40 percent, a median of 39 percent, and a range from 6 percent to 98 percent. At the State level, the 
distribution is more normally distributed with a mean of 55 percent, a median of 54 percent, and a 
range from 1 percent to 84 percent. In order to make predictions about the data for effective 
competition, it is important to understand what the average for effective competition is. Since the 
distribution for effective competition at both the MCC and State level is not a perfect normal 
distribution, the mean, median, or mode can describe the average of effective competition. With this in 
mind, the impact that the predictive variables are estimated to have on effective competition all have to 
be analyzed with these distributions in mind.  
Contract Characteristics 
This section examines the relationship between rates of effective competition and four contract 
characteristics: Fixed Price, Indefinite Delivery Vehicles, and two subcategories of Indefinite Delivery 




Fixed Price  
Fixed price refers to a category of contract pricing mechanisms where the cost per unit or rate cost is set 
in the terms of the contract. This includes both firm fixed-price contracts and other variations, such as 
fixed price incentive fee. Fixed price is used as a predictor to estimate rates of effective competition. 
Over the 2000–2014 period, between three-fifths and two-thirds of overall defense contract obligations 
were awarded under fixed-price contract types in every year. In general, fixed-price contracts are 
expected to receive more effective competition than cost-reimbursement contract types; fixed-price 
contracts are traditionally used where requirements are more certain, which indicates lower risk to 
vendors. Figure 2-2 displays the distribution of FP contract obligations at both the MCC level and state 
level.  
Figure 2-2: Distribution of Fixed-Price Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution of fixed-price contract obligations is skewed to the left and unimodal. 
The data range from 10 percent to 100 percent, with a mean of 78 percent and a median of 89 percent. 
This indicates that, for the majority of MCCs, fixed-price contract obligations account for more than 79 
percent of their total contract obligations; the third quartile is at 99 percent, indicating that 25 percent 
of MCCs see fixed-price contracts for shares equal to or greater than 99 percent. At the state level, the 
spread of fixed-price contract obligations is more normally distributed, with a mean of 74 percent and 
median of 77 percent. The distribution is slightly skewed to the left, and ranges from 42 percent to 98 
percent.  
The predicted relationship between fixed-price contract obligations and effective competition at both 





Figure 2-3: Rate of Effective Competition for Fixed-Price Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis 
The predicted relationship between fixed-price contract obligations and effective competition at the 
MCC level is slightly positive and linear. At the state level, the relationship resembles a positive parabolic 
function such that effective competition increases as contract pricing mechanism usage within a state 
becomes less mixed.  
Indefinite Delivery Vehicle 
Indefinite Delivery Vehicle (IDV), which refers to a number of types of contract vehicle where the 
duration and/or scope of the contract are not explicitly limited, is used as a predictor to estimate rates 
of effective competition. Between two-fifths to a half of all DoD contract obligations were awarded 
under various IDV contract types between 2000 and 2013. In general, IDV contracts see higher rates of 
effective competition than do definitive contract types, though this is partially a function of the fact that 
most large weapon system acquisition projects, which are often awarded without competition, are 
structured as definitive contracts. Figure 2-4 displays the distribution of IDV contracts at both the MCC 





Figure 2-4: Distribution of IDV Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution of IDV contracts ranges from 0 percent to 99 percent, with a mean and 
median of 59 percent. This distribution resembles a normal distribution more than the other predictive 
variables and, according to the median and mean, has a more concrete average value. Thus, the 
likelihood of IDV estimating an unbiased and efficient level of effective competition is greater. At the 
state level, the distribution of IDV contracts ranges from 12 percent to 75 percent, with a mean and 
median at 51 percent. The state level distribution for IDV is slightly skewed to the left and, similar to the 
MCC level, resembles a normal distribution more than other variables. The relationship between IDV 
contracts and effective competition is displayed in Figure 2-5.  
Figure 2-5: Rate of Effective Competition for IDV Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
  
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the relationship between IDV contracts and effective competition resembles a positive 




competition than other types of contract vehicles. At the state level, the relationship between IDV 
contracts and effective competition is negative and parabolic, with higher shares of IDV contract 
obligations correlating with higher rates of effective competition until around 75 percent, though that is 
the function of one outlier data point, and is not statistically significant. 
The study team also examined single-award IDCs and multiple-award IDCs separately from overall IDVs, 
in case the differing reporting rules between the two types of contract vehicle led to disparate trends 
that might be masked while only looking at overall IDVs, a concern that was particularly acute with 
respect to competition. 
Mutiple-Award IDC 
Multipe-award IDCs are a type of IDV where vendors compete initially to become prequalified vendors 
for an IDV contract, and only those limited number of prequalified vendors are permitted to compete 
for contract actions under that contract. Over the 2000–2014 period, 11 percent of overall defense 
contract obligations were awarded under multiple-award IDCs, though the share has risen significantly 
over the period, from 8 percent in 2000 to a high of 16 percent in 2011. Over the 2000–2014 period, 70 
percent of multiple-award IDC contract obligations were awarded after effective competition; for that 
same period, the share of contract obligations awarded after competition with only one offer (16 
percent) was more than double the share awarded without competition (7 percent). The distribution of 
multiple-award IDC contract obligations is displayed in Figure 2-6. 
Figure 2-6: Distribution of Multiple-Award IDC Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
For both the MCC and the state level, the distribution of multiple-award IDC obligations is skewed to the 
right. For MCCs, obligations range from 0 percent to 60 percent, with a mean of 11 percent and a 
median of 9 percent. For states, obligations range from 1 percent to 47 percent, with a mean of 12 
percent and a median of 8 percent. The relationship between multiple-award IDC contract obligations 






Figure 2-7: Rate of Effective Competition for Multiple-Award IDC Contract Obligations, by MCC and 
Place of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
Once the outliers are accounted for, MCCs show a small positive linear relationship between multiple-
award IDC usage and effective competition; that is, as the former increases, the latter also increases. For 
states, there is a positive linear relatioship at low shares of obligations, with a sinosodal relationship at 
higher shares that is primarily the result of a few outlier data points. 
Single-Award IDC  
Single-award IDC contracts are IDV contracts where a single bidder is chosen to perform all contract 
actions. Between 2000 and 2014, single-award IDCs accounted for 32 percent of overall DoD contract 
obligations. For the 2000–2014 period, 56 percent of single-award IDC contract obligations were 
awarded after effective competition. Figure 2-8 displays the distribution of Single-Award IDC contract 
obligations.  
Figure 2-8: Distribution of Single-Award IDC Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 




For both MCCs and states, the distribution of contract obligations resembles a normal distribution, with 
the state level closer to the “ideal” normal distribution. For MCCs, obligations ranged from 0 percent to 
94 percent, with a mean of 35 percent and a median of 32 percent. For states, obligations ranged from 
10 percent to 64 percent, with a mean of 35 percent and a median of 34 percent. The predicted 
relationships between single-award IDC contract obligations and effective competition at the MCC and 
state levels are displayed in Figure 2-9. 
Figure 2-9: Rate of Effective Competition for Single-Award IDC Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place 
of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the data show an overall positive linear relationship; as the share of single-award IDC 
contract obligations increases, effective competition also increases. At the state level, there is a slight 
positive linear relationship, discounting a few outlier data points. 
Product or Service Categories 
This section examines the relationship between effective competition and a number of product or 
service categories, as well as overall services contracting. 
Services 
Government Product or Service Codes (PSCs) are used in FPDS to identify what is being purchased for a 
particular contract action. DoD defines all codes that start with a letter as Services; CSIS defines Services 
similarly, except that the CSIS taxonomy separates out what the study team considers to be Research & 
Development (R&D) into a separate category. Between 2000 and 2013, Services accounted for between 
39 percent and 45 percent of overall defense contract obligations in every year. The rate of effective 
competition for Services overall has been fluctuating around 60 percent in the early to mid-2000s, but 
has held steady between 65 percent and 67 percent since 2007. Figure 2-10 displays the distribution of 





Figure 2-10: Distribution of Services Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution for Services ranges from 0 percent to 98 percent, with a mean of 56 
percent and a median of 68 percent. Services is not nearly a normal distribution and its variability should 
be taken into consideration when it is used to predict effective competition. The ambiguous measure of 
value for its average limits its power to predict effective competition at the MCC level. At the state level, 
the Services distribution ranges from 8 percent to 92 percent, with a mean of 46 percent and median of 
48 percent. At the state level, the distribution for Service contracts is more normally distributed than at 
the MCC level and its average is less ambiguous than at the MCC level. The relationship between 
Services contracts and effective competition is displayed in Figure 2-11. 
Figure 2-11: Rate of Effective Competition for Services Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
  
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the relationship between Services and effective competition is parabolic. It also has a 
few outliers that influence the relationship’s predicted slope. Generally speaking, this means that MCCs 




lower rates of effective competition than those that either contract primarily for Services or do very 
little Services contracting. In response to this nonlinear relationship, the model will be built using a 
second-order polynomial regression at the MCC level. At the state level, the relationship between 
Services and effective competition is more linear and includes fewer outliers. Higher levels of obligations 
going to Services therefore correlate with higher levels of effective competition for states. Therefore the 
model in relation to the Services variable will be built as a linear regression.  
Aircraft  
The Aircraft product category accounted for 12 percent of overall DoD contract obligations over the 
2000–2014 period, tied for the second-largest share of any product or service category. Over that same 
period, only 13 percent of contract obligations for Aircraft were awarded after effective competition. 
The distribution of Aircraft contracts is displayed in Figure 2-12. 
Figure 2-12: Distribution of Aircraft Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution of Aircraft contract obligations ranges from 0 percent to 45 percent, 
with a mean of 3 percent and a median of 0 percent. The distribution is unimodal and skewed to the 
right. This indicates that there are not very many MCCs with large shares of contract obligations 
awarded for Aircraft. At the state level, the distribution is more evenly spread and ranges from 0 percent 
to 45 percent, with a mean of 8 percent and a median of 3 percent. The distribution is still unimodal, 
with the most frequently occuring percent at 0. The predicted relationship between Aircraft contract 





Figure 2-13: Rate of Effective Competition for Aircraft Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
  
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the relationship between Aircraft contract obligations is for the most part a verticle 
slope at 0 percent. However, there are a few data points that form a slightly negative, linear 
relationship. Because there are so few data points to form this relationship, the confidence interval 
around the fitted line is very large. At the state level, the data are more spread and there is a negative 
relationship between increasing Aircraft contract obligations and increasing effective competition. This 
appears to primarily be a function of the the highest-value, least-competitive Aircraft contract 
obligations (mostly for production/procurement of actual Aircraft platforms) being concentrated in a 
few states, while a number of states have small amounts of obligations for aircraft parts, for which the 
market is notably more competitive. 
Engines and Power Plants  
Engines and Power Plants have accounted for 3 percent of overall defense contract obligations from 
2000–2014, and accounted for between 2 percent and 4 percent in every year during that period. 
Between 2000 and 2014, only 22 percent of Engines and Power Plants contract obligations were 
awarded after effective competition. The distribution of Engines and Power Plants contract obligations is 





Figure 2-14: Distribution of Engines and Power Plants Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, 75 percent of MCCs award less than 0.4 percent of their contract obligations for 
Engines and Power Plants. The distribution ranges from 0 percent to 25 percent, with a mean of 2 
percent and a median of 0 percent. At the state level, the distribution ranges from 0 percent to 20 
percent, with a mean of 2 percent and a median of 1 percent. The predicted relationship between 
Engines and Power Plants contract obligations and effective competition is displayed in Figure 2-15. 
Figure 2-15: Rate of Effective Competition for Engines and Power Plants Contract Obligations, by MCC 
and Place of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the majority relationship between Engines and Power Plants contract obligations and 
effective competition is vertical at about 0 percent of contracts obligated. On the whole, however, there 
is no correlative relationship at the MCC level between Engines and Power Plants and effective 
competition. At the state level, shares of Engines and Power Plants contract obligations between 0 




obligations, the relationship depends on a few outlier data points, but continues to see declining rates of 
effective competition.  
Ground Vehicles 
The Ground Vehicles product category accounted for between 3 percent and 6 percent of overall DoD 
contract obligations in all but one year (9 percent in 2008) between 2000 and 2012. In 2013 and 2014, 
that share declined to 2 percent. Over the 2000-–2014 period, the rate of effective competition for 
Ground Vehicles contract obligations was 30 percent. The distribution of Ground Vehicles contracts is 
displayed in Figure 2-16. 
Figure 2-16: Distribution of Ground Vehicles Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At both the MCC level and state level, the distribution of Ground Vehicles contracts is unimodal and 
skewed to the right. At the MCC level, the distribution ranges from 0 percent to 48 percent, with a mean 
of 2 percent and a median of 0 percent. At the state level, the distribution ranges from 0 percent to 69 
percent, with a mean of 5 percent and median of 1 percent. The relationship between Ground Vehicles 






Figure 2-17: Rate of Effective Competition for Ground Vehicles Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place 
of Performance 
  
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, effective competition does not change by more than 1 percent at different levels of 
Ground Vehicles contract obligations, and less than 25 percent of the distribution lies above 0.7 percent 
of contract obligations. For MCCs, the share of Ground Vehicles contract obligations does not impact the 
level of effective competition. At the state level, the impact Ground Vehicles contracts have on effective 
competition does not change by more than a percent throughout the whole distribution of Ground 
Vehicles contract obligations.  
Missiles & Space 
The Missiles & Space products category has accounted for 3 percent of overall defense contract 
obligations over the 2000–2014, and remained between 2 percent and 4 percent in every year during 
that period. For the 2000–2014 period, the rate of effective competition for Missiles & Space contract 
obligations was 13 percent, tied for the lowest rate of any products or services category. The 





Figure 2-18: Distribution of Missiles & Space Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution ranges from 0 percent to 56 percent, with a mean of 2 percent and a 
median of 0 percent; Missiles & Space contract obligations are highly concentrated in a few MCCs. At 
the state level, no state awards more than 27 percent of its contract obligations for Missiles & Space. 
The distribution ranges from 0 percent to 17 percent, with a mean of 3 percent and median of 0.1 
percent. The predicted relationship between Missiles & Space contract obligations and effective 
competition at both the MCC and state level is displayed in Figure 2-19. 
Figure 2-19: Rate of Effective Competition for Missiles & Space Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place 
of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, there is no strong relationship bewteen Missiles & Space PSCs and effective 
competition, the only non-vertical relationship is determined by a few outliers. At the state level, the 
data are distributed a little more widely; however, the majority of the data form a vertical line at 0 
percent of contract obligations, with a sinosidal relationship in those states that had significant shares of 





The Ships products category has accounted for 4 percent of overall defense contract obligations 
between 2000 and 2014, and has remained between 3 percent and 5 percent throughout the period. 
From 2000–2014, 31 percent of Ships contract obligations were awarded after effective competition, 
though this rate has varied widely, ranging from a low of 13 percent in 2006 to a high of 60 percent in 
2002. The distribution of Ships contract obligations is displayed in Figure 2-20. 
Figure 2-20: Distribution of Ships Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At both the MCC and state level, the distribution is centered at about 0 percent. At the MCC level, the 
distribution of Ships contract obligations ranges from 0 percent to 38 percent, with a mean of 1 percent 
and median of 0 percent. At the state level, the distribution of Ships contract obligations ranges from 0 
percent to 62 percent, with a mean of 4 percent and a median of 0.3 percent. The predicted 
relationships between Ships contract obligations and effective competition at both the MCC and state 





Figure 2-21: Rate of Effective Competition for Ships Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, Ships contract obligations do not appear to correlate with changes in effective 
competition, due to the limited number of MCCs with significant levels of Ships contract obligations. At 
the state level, this relationship is a little more varied at x-intercept 0 percent; however, this does not 
result in any inference on whether or not Ships contract obligations affect effective competition. As with 
MCCs, the only varying levels of effective competition depending on Ships contract obligations are from 
a few outliers.  
“Other Products”  
“Other Products,” a product category that is primarily composed of commodities and commercial goods, 
has accounted for 5 percent of overall defense contract obligations between 2000 and 2014, and has 
remained between 3 percent and 6 percent in all but one year (8 percent in 2005.) From 2000–2014, 49 
percent of contract obligations for “Other Products” were awarded after effective competition. The 





Figure 2-22: Distribution of “Other Products” Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
  
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution of “Other Products” contracts obligated is skewed to the right and 
ranges from 0 percent to 83 percent, with a mean of 11 percent and a median of 5 percent. At the state 
level, the distribution ranges from 0 percent to 15 percent, with a mean of 5 percent and a median of 4 
percent. “Other Products” contracts obligated at the state level are slightly skewed to the right, showing 
a more even distribution than at the MCC level. The predicted relationship between effective 
competition and “Other Products” contract obligations is displayed in Figure 2-23. 
Figure 2-23: Rate of Effective Competition for “Other Products” Contract Obligations, by MCC and 
Place of Performance 
 Source: 
FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, most of the MCCs award less than 10 percent of their overall contract obligations for 
“Other Products” and do not form a significant prediction for effective competition. The few outliers are 
not helpful for accurately estimating effective competition. At the state level, the distribution is more 
evenly spread but has a much smaller range. The overal trend shows that the share of “Other Products” 




Facilities-Related Services & Construction  
Facilities-Related Services & Construction (FRS&C) has accounted for 12 percent of overall defense 
contract obligations over the 2000–2014 period, remaining between 10 percent and 14 percent in every 
year. FRS&C contract obligations have been highly competitive, with 73 percent awarded after effective 
competition between 2000 and 2014.The distribution of FRS&C contract obligations is displayed in 
Figure 2-24. 
Figure 2-24: Distribution of FRS&C Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At both the MCC level, the distribution of FRS&C contract obligations is skewed to the right and 
unimodal. The distribution of obligations range from 0 percent to 84 percent, with a mean of 19 percent 
and a median of 5 percent. For states, obligations range from 1 percent to 73 percent, with a mean of 21 
percent and a median of 15 percent. The predicted relationship between effective competition and 
FRS&C contract obligations is displayed in Figure 2-25. 
Figure 2-25: Rate of Effective Competition for FRS&C Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 




At the MCC level, the data show an overall increasing, linear relationship. As the share of FRS&C contract 
obligations within an MCC increases, the rate of effective competition increases. At the state level, a 
similar trend is observed, with higher shares of FRS&C correlating with higher rates of effective 
competition. 
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services  
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support (PAMS) have accounted for 15 percent of 
overall defense contract obligations between 2000 and 2014, and have remained between 13 percent 
and 17 percent in every year during that period. From 2000–2014, 58 percent of PAMS contract 
obligations were awarded after effective competition. The distribution of PAMS contract obligations is 
displayed in Figure 2-26. 
Figure 2-26: Distribution of PAMS Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
The distributions of PAMS contract obligations are skewed to the right for both MCCs and states, with 
the MCC distribution unimodal at 0 percent. For MCCs, obligations range from 0 percent to 82 percent, 
with a mean of 18 percent and a median of 13 percent. For states, obligations range from 2 percent to 
32 percent, with a mean of 14 percent and a median of 9 percent. The predicted relationships between 





Figure 2-27: Rate of Effective Competition for PAMS Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the relationship between the share of PAMS contract obligations and effective 
competition appears to be largely sinosidal. At the state level, there appears to be a positive linear 
relationship at very low shares of obligations, and no significant relationship at higher shares of 
obligations, with the decline at high shares being due to a single outlier data point. 
Platform Portfolios 
This section examines the relationship between effective competition and a number of platform 
portfolios, which combine product, service, and R&D contracts related to a particular type of platform or 
system into one category. 
Aircraft and Drones 
Aircraft and Drones, a platform portfolio category that includes all related products, services, and R&D 
contract obligations, is used as a predictor to estimate rates of effective competition. For the 2000–2014 
period, an average of 19 percent of overall defense contract obligations in each year were awarded for 
Aircraft and Drones. Over that same period, only 23 percent of Aircraft and Drones contract obligations 
were awarded after effective competition, the lowest rate of any platform portfolio. Figure 2-28 displays 





Figure 2-28: Distribution of Aircraft and Drones Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis 
At the MCC level, the distribution of Aircraft and Drones contracts is largely skewed to the right and 
strongly unimodal (median = 0 percent), the result of Aircraft and Drones contracts being concentrated 
in a relatively small number of MCCs. Because of this, Aircraft and Drones is unlikely to have significant 
predictive power for effective competition within MCCs. The data range from 0 percent to 71 percent, 
with a mean of 5 percent and median of 0 percent. At the state level, the distribution of Aircraft and 
Drones contracts is also skewed to the right but with a more evenly distributed spread. The data range 
from 0 percent to 55 percent, with a mean of 12 percent and a median of 5 percent. The relationship 
between Aircraft contracts and Effective Competition is displayed in Figure 2-29 below. 
Figure 2-29: Rate of Effective Competition for Aircraft and Drones Contract Obligations, by MCC and 
Place of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
The predicted relationship between Aircraft contracts and effective competition at the MCC level is 




the outliers, there is a negative linear relationship. At the state level, the relationship has a stronger 
pattern with lower confidence intervals and resembles a negative cubic function. As Aircraft contract 
obligations increase, effective competition decreases at different rates depending on what level of 
Aircraft obligations is being examined. This makes a certain degree of intuitive sense, as states with high 
shares of contract obligations awarded for Aircraft and Drones are likely to include those where major 
weapons systems are produced, and there is very little (if any) competition for production of most 
Aircraft and Drones platforms. 
Electronics and Communications 
Electronics and Communications, a platform portfolio category that includes all related products, 
services, and R&D contract obligations, is used as a predictor to estimate rates of effective competition. 
Electronics and Communications have accounted for a significant share of overall defense contract 
obligations in recent years, averaging 13 percent between 2010 and 2014. Only 43 percent of contract 
obligations for Electronics & Communications were awarded after effective competition over the same 
period, in part due to unusually high levels of competitive contracts awarded after receiving only one 
offer. Figure 2-30 displays the distribution of Electronics and Communications contracts at both the MCC 
level and State Level. 
Figure 2-30: Distribution of Electronics & Communications Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution of Electronics and Communication is skewed to the right with a range 
from 0 percent to 74 percent, with a mean of 17 percent and median of 13 percent. At the state level, 
the distribution of Electronics and Communications is also skewed to the right with a range from 1 
percent to 50 percent, a mean at 13 percent, and median at 10 percent. The relationship between 





Figure 2-31: Rate of Effective Competition for Electronics and Communications Contract Obligations, 
by MCC and Place of Performance 
  
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the relationship between Electronics and Communication and effective competition is 
nonlinear, has varying confidence, and is affected by outliers. At the state level, the relationship 
resembles a more linear pattern and looks as though when Electronics and Communication contract 
obligations increase, effective competition decreases. The confidence intervals for this relationship are 
high, which limits the predictive power for Electronics and Communication on effective competition.  
The relatively low rate of effective competition for Electronics and Communications is somewhat 
counterintuitive, given the broad industrial base for such products and services. However, much of this 
industrial base is in the commercial sector, and DoD has long had difficulties in identifying innovation in 
the commercial sector and convincing innovative vendors to go through the hurdles necessary to 
contract with DoD.  
Land Vehicles 
Land Vehicles, a platform portfolio category that includes all related products, services, and R&D 
contract obligations, is used as a predictor to estimate rates of effective competition. Land vehicles 
accounted for a significant share of contract obligations (peaking at 10 percent in 2008) during the mid-
2000s as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were at their peaks, but since 2010, only 4 percent of 
overall defense contract obligations have been for Land Vehicles. The rate of effective competition for 
Land Vehicles has been relatively low, with an average of just 33 percent of contract obligations 
awarded after effective competition between 2000 and 2014. Figure 2-32 displays the distribution of 





Figure 2-32: Distribution of Land Vehicles Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At both the MCC level and state level, the distribution of Land Vehicles contracts is strongly unimodal 
and skewed to the right. At the MCC level, Land Vehicles ranges from 0 percent to 50 percent, with a 
mean of 0.2 percent and a median of 0 percent. At the state level, Land Vehicles ranges from 0 percent 
to 72 percent, with a mean of 6 percent and a median of 1 percent. The relationship between Land 
Vehicle and effective competition is displayed in Figure 2-33. 
Figure 2-33: Rate of Effective Competition for Land Vehicles Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
The predicted relationship between Land Vehicles contracts and effective competition at the MCC level 
is strongly influenced by the outliers in Land Vehicles contracts. For the majority of the data, there is 
little to no relationship between Land Vehicles and effective competition. Similar results occur on the 
state level, where, even the general trend looks as though it’s decreasing, the relationship depends on a 




states and MCCs that see significant amounts of contract obligations for Land Vehicles means that the 
variable does not have significant explanatory power. 
Missiles and Space 
Missiles and Space, a platform portfolio category that includes all related products, services, and R&D 
contract obligations, is used as a predictor to estimate rates of effective competition. Missiles and Space 
has accounted for between 7 percent and 8 percent of overall defense contract obligations in every year 
in the 2000–2014 period. For that same period, the average rate of effective competition for Missiles 
and Space contract obligations has been 28 percent, well below the overall rate for DoD contract 
obligations. Figure 2-34 displays the distribution of Missiles and Space contracts at both the MCC level 
and State level. 
Figure 2-34: Distribution of Missiles and Space Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution of Missiles and Space contract obligations ranges from 0 percent to 73 
percent, with a mean of 4 percent and a median of 0 percent. This indicates that Missiles and Space 
contract obligations most likely will not have a statistically significant effect on effective competition, 
and if they do then it would be negative. At the state level, the distribution for Missiles and Space 
contract obligations has a more even spread, if skewed to the right and unimodal. Missiles and Space 
contract obligations at the state level range from 0 percent to 31 percent, with a mean of 4 percent and 
a median of 1 percent. The relationship between Missiles and Space contract obligations and effective 





Figure 2-35: Rate of Effective Competition for Missiles and Space Contract Obligations, by MCC and 
Place of Performance 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
The predicted relationship between Missiles and Space contract obligations and effective competition at 
the MCC level is influenced by a few outliers. Otherwise, the relationship is almost nonexistent because 
there are few MCCs with significant shares of Missiles and Space contract obligations. At the state level, 
the relationship is also influenced by a few outliers; however, as was seen in the histogram in Figure 2-
34, there is a more evenly distributed spread for contract obligations within states than within MCCs, 
which means there will be a more definitive relationship between Missiles and Space contract 
obligations and effective competition.  
Ships & Submarines 
Ships & Submarines, a platform portfolio category that includes all related products, services, and R&D 
contract obligations, is used as a predictor to estimate rates of effective competition. Over the 2000–
2014 period, an average of 6 percent of overall DoD contract obligations were awarded for Ships & 
Submarines. Over that same period, 32 percent of contract obligations for Ships & Submarines were 
awarded after effective competition. Figure 2-36 displays the distribution of Ships & Submarines 





Figure 2-36: Distribution of Ships & Submarines Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution of Ships & Submarines contracts obligated ranges from 0 percent to 54 
percent, with a mean of 2 percent and a median of 0 percent. This distribution is skewed to the right and 
indicates that Ships & Submarines contract obligations are highly concentrated in a few MCCs. At the 
state level, the distribution of Ships & Submarines contracts obligated ranges from 0 percent to 68 
percent, with a mean of 5 percent and a median of 0.5 percent. The distribution at the state level is also 
skewed to the right but more evenly distributed. Contract obligations for Ships & Submarines are more 
evenly distributed among states than MCCs, but there are only a small number for which even a quarter 
of their total obligations go to Ships & Submarines. The estimated relationship between Ships contract 
obligations and Effective Competition is displayed in Figure 2-37. 
Figure 2-37: Rate of Effective Competition for Ships & Submarines Contract Obligations, by MCC and 
Place of Performance 
 




The predicted relationship between Ships & Submarines and effective competition at the MCC level is 
almost completely inelastic, save for a few outliers. This indicates that the likelihood of an increase in 
Ships contract obligations having a statistically significant impact on effective competition within MCCs 
is close to zero. At the state level, there is a little more variability in the data. In states where Ships & 
Submarines account for small shares of overall contract obligations, there appears to be a positive 
relationship between increasing Ships & Submarines contract obligations and increasing effective                                       
competition.  
Weapons and Ammunition 
Weapons and Ammunition, a platform portfolio category that includes all related products, services, and 
R&D contract obligations, is used as a predictor to estimate rates of effective competition. Contract 
obligations for Weapons and Ammunition account for a relatively minor share of overall defense 
contract obligations, averaging 4 percent between 2010 and 2014. Over that same period, only 36 
percent of contract obligations were awarded after effective competition. Figure 2-38 displays the 
distribution of Weapons and Ammunition contracts at both the MCC level and state Level. 
Figure 2-38: Distribution of Weapons and Ammunition Contract Obligations, by MCC and Place of 
Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
At the MCC level, the distribution of Weapons and Ammunition contracts range from 0 percent to 20 
percent, with a mean of 1 percent and median of less than 0.2 percent. The distribution is both skewed 
to the right and unimodal. The lack of normality around the mean and the outlier may affect the 
magnitude of the predictive power Weapons and Ammunition contracts has on effective competition. At 
the state level, Weapons and Ammunition is also skewed to the right but to a smaller degree than at the 
MCC level. The category’s distribution ranges from 0 percent to 47 percent, with a mean of 6 percent 
and median of 3 percent. Weapons and Ammunition seems to have a smaller degree of variability than 
at the MCC level, but it also is not nearly normal and may not effectively predict effective competition in 
an unbiased or consistent way. The relationship between Weapons and Ammunition contracts and 




Figure 2-39: Rate of Effective Competition for Weapons and Ammunition Contract Obligations, by MCC 
and Place of Performance 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis  
The predicted relationship between Weapons and Ammunition and effective competition at the MCC 
level has a very large confidence interval (reaching into the impossible negative competition and 
greater-than-100-percent competition ranges) and is highly variable because of the few outliers. The 
predicted relationship emulates a cosine function; however, this prediction is likely skewed by the 
outliers. Thus, when outliers are accounted for, the relationship would likely resemble a negative linear 
pattern. At the state level, the relationship between Weapons and Ammunition obligations and effective 
competition is also nonlinear, has large confidence intervals and is skewed by the outliers.  
Final Thoughts 
A number of variables that the study team hypothesized as correlating with differing rates of effective 
competition for either or both of MCCs and states were not judged to have significant predictive power. 
In many cases, this is the result of the fact that product/service categories and platform portfolios have 
the vast majority of their contract obligations concentrated in a relatively few MCCs and states, meaning 
that there are not enough useful observations to provide evidence of significant correlation. 
Nonetheless, the study team has identified variables that, taken together, do provide sufficient 





III. Modeling DoD Effective Competition Rates  
For both states and MCCs, the study team built an ordinary least-squares (OLS) model in order to 
calculate an estimated rate of effective competition for each state and MCC, along with the descriptive 
statistics that measure the strength of the model. Then a predictive model uses these least-squares 
models and the data from FY2000–2013 as the basis to generate a prediction of 2014 effective 
competition rates, based on the variables previously described. In the final models, each of the variables 
has been tested and validated as having a statistically significant correlation with, or a meaningful 
impact on, the model estimating rates of effective competition.  
Next, the study team used the predictive model based on the final model explained above to compare 
the estimated rate of effective competition to the actual rate of effective competition for FY2014 for 
each observation. The study team calculated the actual rate of effective competition by dividing 
contract obligations awarded after competition with two or more offers by total contract obligations. 
The predictive model estimates the rates of effective competition for each MCC and state using the final 
model described above and data from FY2014. The results of the predictive model estimate the effective 
competition for each MCC and give the confidence interval for each estimate.  
The first iteration of this predictive model for MCCs focused on the MCC level of analysis. In order to try 
and improve the predictive power of the model, the study team revised the predictive model to examine 
obligations at the contracting office level. The model built at the contracting office level was used to 
predict the estimated rate of effective competition to the actual rate of effective competition for 
FY2014. These contracting office-level predictions were then aggregated back to the MCC level by 
summing all the contracting offices under each MCC. Finally, these sums represented the predictions for 
effective competition at the MCC level and were compared to the actual values of effective competition 
for FY2014. Though this change did provide a more granular view into contracting data at the MCC level, 
it did not significantly improve the predictive power of the model, and thus was not incorporated into 
the final model. 
At this point, this predictive model is not intended to evaluate performance in promoting effective 
competition—the MCC model is only capable of explaining about half of the variance in effective 
competition rates, though the model for states explains nearly three-quarters of the variance. The 95 
percent confidence intervals for both the MCC and state models remain higher than would be ideal, but 
have narrowed notably since the initial iterations of the predictive models. 
Because variables used to evaluate states versus those used for MCCs are different, the following 
discussion will be divided into two sections, highlighting a selection of variables for states/MCCs that the 
model suggests are worthy of further study. 
Major Command Regression 
Table 3-1 displays the results from the study team’s OLS model predicting rates of effective competition 




Table 3-1: Effective Competition at 







  (0.07) 
Services 0.74*** 
  (0.24) 
Services^2 -0.81** 




  (0.69) 
IDV -0.01 





  (0.13) 
R^2 0.53 
Adjusted R^2 0.49 
Observations 63 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
Variables that correlate with a lower rate of effective competition:  
 Share of contract obligations awarded under single-award IDCs 
 Share of contract obligations awarded under IDV contract types—weak effect 
 Mix of Products/Services (Services^2)—as the contracting portfolio of a MCC becomes more 
mixed between Products and Services, the rate of effective competition declines. 
Variables that correlate with a higher rate of effective competition: 
 Share of contract obligations awarded for Services 





U.S. State Regression 
 Table 3-2 displays the results from the study team’s OLS model predicting rates of effective competition 
at the state Level.  







  (0.28) 
Services 0.52*** 
  (0.08) 
Aircraft and Drones -0.19` 




  (0.10) 
Fixed Price -1.48` 
  (0.82) 
Fixed Price^2 1.04` 
  (0.59) 
Engines & Power 
Plants 
-0.69` 
  (0.36) 
PAMS -0.39* 
  (0.18) 
“Other Products” 0.06 
  (0.41) 
R^2 0.77 
Adjusted R^2 0.73 
Observations 53 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, `p<.10 
 
Variables that correlate with a lower rate of effective competition: 
 Share of contract obligations awarded for Aircraft and Drones (platform portfolio category) 
 Share of contract obligations awarded under fixed-price contract types 





Variables that correlate with a greater rate of effective competition: 
 Share of contract obligations awarded for Services 
 Share of contract obligations awarded under IDV contract types 
 Mix of contract pricing mechanisms (Fixed Price^2)—as the usage of different contract pricing 
mechanisms within a state becomes more diverse, the rate of effective competition increases. 





IV. Examination of Outlier Major Commands and U.S. States 
After creating the predictive model and analyzing the causal roots of the variables that drive the model, 
the study team analyzed FY2014 contracting. By applying the ordinary least-squares (OLS) model derived 
from FY2000 to FY2013 data to the FY2014 inputs, the study team estimated effective competition rates 
for each of the states and major commands in the sample for FY2014, and then compared the predicted 
value to the actual effective competition rate for each state or major command in FY2014. The intent of 
this process was to identify the MCCs and states that exemplify or defy DoD-wide patterns.  
The limits of the predictive strength of the model, most notably the large 95 percent confidence 
intervals for the “estimated” 2014 effective competition rates, mean that the following analysis is not 
intended to grade MCCs and states on their competition performance. Rather, the following sections are 
intended as a proof of concept for the study methodology, demonstrating the ability of the CSIS model 
to identify “outliers” among the MCCs and states. The drivers of the differences between actual and 
“estimated” effective competition rates for the identified states and MCCs will be used to improve 
future iterations of the CSIS predictive model. 
Complete results from the MCC and state predictive models are presented in Appendices 1 and 2. 
Major Contracting Commands39 
This section describes five MCCs: four with significant levels of contract obligations that show notable 
differences between “estimated” effective competition rates and actual rates in 2014, and one MCC 
where “estimated” and actual rates are nearly identical. 
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) 
Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $8.4 billion 
“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 63 percent 
Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 36 percent (Lower limit of 95 percent confidence interval: 33 
percent) 
AFSPC notably underperformed its “estimated” competition rate in 2014, despite higher-than-average 
rates of effective competition for the Electronics & Communications platform portfolios and the PAMS 
services category, due to lower-than-average rates of effective competition for the Facilities & 
Construction platform portfolio and overall R&D.  
As would be expected, the majority of contract obligations by AFSPC are for products or services related 
to Missiles & Space Systems. At first glance, the Missiles & Space Systems platform portfolio, which 
accounted for nearly half of AFSPC contract obligations in 2014, appears to have a higher-than-average 
rate of effective competition within AFSPC (45 percent in 2014, compared to 26 percent for overall 
                                                          
39 Because the 95 percent confidence intervals for the MCC model are so wide, no MCCs with significant levels of 
contract obligations fell outside of their intervals. Where the selected examples are at the fringes of the 95% 




DoD). This is primarily an artifact of categorization, however—almost all of AFSPC contract obligations 
for the “Other Services” platform portfolio, which account for 29 percent of AFSPC contract obligations 
in 2014, are for space launch services, and all of those obligations were awarded without competition. 
CSIS has traditionally categorized transportation of physical goods as a service, rather than based on 
what platform was used for the transport. If those space launch services were folded into the Missiles & 
Space Systems platform portfolio, however, the rate of effective competition within AFSPC would fall to 
28 percent, nearly in line with the rate for overall DoD. Going forward, the study team will reclassify 
space launch services to be included under the Missiles & Space Systems platform portfolio. 
AFSPC did see higher-than-average levels of effective competition for the Electronics & Communications 
platform portfolio (71 percent in 2014, compared to 44 percent for overall DoD) and the PAMS services 
category (84 percent in 2014, compared to 58 percent for DoD overall); those two categories account 
for 6 percent and 11 percent of 2014 AFSPC contract obligations, respectively. By contrast, R&D, which 
accounted for 25 percent of AFSPC contract obligations in 2014, saw only 37 percent of those contract 
obligations awarded after effective competition, compared to 46 percent for DoD R&D overall. Similarly, 
the Facilities and Construction platform portfolio, which accounted for 9 percent of AFSPC contract 
obligations in 2014, saw only 50 percent of contract obligations awarded after effective competition, 
compared to 76 percent for DoD overall. 
U.S Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $17.2 billion 
“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 67 percent 
Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 81 percent 
USACE notably overperformed its “estimated” rate of effective competition in 2014. This is somewhat 
surprising, as USACE’s contracting portfolio has characteristics that would suggest that the model would, 
if anything, overestimate effective competition: USACE contracts almost entirely for services, which 
correlates with higher rates of effective competition in the MCC model, and low shares of obligations 
awarded under single-award IDCs, which correlates with higher levels of effective competition. The gap 
between the actual rate and the “estimated” rate is primarily the result of a higher-than-average rate of 
effective competition for the Facilities and Construction platform portfolio, which accounted for 87 
percent of USACE contract obligations in 2014. Eighty-three percent of USACE contract obligations for 
Facilities and Construction were awarded after effective competition in 2014, compared to 76 percent 
for DoD overall. 
Army Materiel Command (AMC) 
Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $49.6 billion 
“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 34 percent 




The main driver of AMC’s higher-than-“estimated” rate of effective competition in 2014 is the unusually 
high rate of effective competition for one category of its services contracts portfolio. 
Based solely on the correlative variables for AMC, AMC effective competition rates being higher than 
“estimated” in 2014 seems unusual: a nearly even mix of products and services, as well as higher-than-
average shares of obligations awarded under IDVs in general, and single-award IDCs specifically, 
correlate with lower rates of competition. The main driver of the higher-than-estimated rate of effective 
competition for AMC seems to be in the rate of effective competition for professional, administrative, 
and management support services (PAMS): PAMS account for nearly a quarter of AMC’s contract 
portfolio, and 66 percent were awarded after effective competition, compared to 36 percent for DoD 
overall. 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) 
Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $7.7 billion 
“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 51 percent 
Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 33 percent 
The main drivers of the lower-than-predicted rate of effective competition are twofold. First, only 3 
percent of NAVSUP contract obligations for the Aircraft & Drones platform portfolio in 2014 were 
awarded after effective competition, compared to 21 percent for DoD overall. Second, only 23 percent 
of NAVSUP contract obligations for the Electronics & Communications platform portfolio were awarded 
after effective competition, compared to 45 percent for DoD overall. 
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) 
Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $37.4 billion 
“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 33 percent 
Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 30 percent 
Unlike the previous four examples, where particular categories of contracts have significantly 
higher/lower rates of effective competition than DoD overall in one direction, there are notable 
differences in both directions for AFMC, which is likely a significant factor in how the model was able to 
so closely predict the 2014 effective competition rate. 
AFMC has a relatively even mix of products and services in its contracting portfolio, which correlates 
with lower competition rates. Only 26 percent of AFMC contract obligations for PAMS in 2014 were 
awarded after effective competition, compared to 36 percent overall. By contrast, for AFMC ERS 
contract obligations, 33 percent of contract obligations were awarded after effective competition, 
compared to 26 percent overall. This lack of unidirectional deviations from “estimated” rates of 
competition is likely a significant factor enabling the predictive model to accurately estimate 2014 




Place of Performance—States 
This section describes four states with significant levels of contract obligations that show notable 
differences between “estimated” effective competition rates and actual rates in 2014, along with one 
state where “estimated” and actual rates are nearly identical. 
Massachusetts 
Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $9.4 billion 
“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 38 percent 
Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 19 percent (Lower limit of 95 percent confidence interval: 14 
percent) 
DoD contract obligations performed in Massachusetts have a lower-than-“estimated” rate of effective 
competition due to lower-than-average rates of competition in virtually every category with significant 
obligations: the Electronics & Communications, Engines & Power Plants, Launchers & Munitions, and 
Missiles & Space product categories; the PAMS services category; and R&D.  
For the Electronics & Communications product category, which accounted for 18 percent of 
Massachusetts contract obligations, 30 percent were awarded after effective competition in 2014, 
compared to 39 percent for DoD overall. Meanwhile, 30 percent of Electronics & Communications 
contract obligations in Massachusetts were awarded after competition with a single offer, over four 
times the rate for DoD overall. The Engines & Power Plants product category, which accounted for 11 
percent of Massachusetts contract obligations in 2014, saw less than 1 percent of contract obligations 
awarded after effective competition, compared to 39 percent for DoD overall. Launchers & Munitions, 
which accounted for 9 percent of 2014 defense contract obligations in Massachusetts, saw a 5 percent 
rate of effective competition, compared to 42 percent for DoD overall. And Missiles & Space, which also 
accounted for 9 percent of contract obligations in Massachusetts, saw 0 percent of contract obligations 
awarded after effective competition, compared to 14 percent for overall DoD. 
The PAMS services category, which accounted for 12 percent of contract obligations in Massachusetts in 
2014, saw only 18 percent of obligations awarded after effective competition, compared to 58 percent 
in 2014. And similarly, R&D, which accounted for 30 percent of contract obligations in Massachusetts, 
saw only 20 percent of contract obligations awarded with effective competition in 2014, compared to 46 
percent for DoD overall. 
The degree to which nearly every major aspect of the contracting portfolio performed in Massachusetts 
underperformed overall DoD competition rates is something that the study team did not observe in any 
other state or MCC with such a diversified contracting portfolio. Further research will be required to 
determine why defense contract obligations awarded for performance in Massachusetts receive such 
unusually low levels of effective competition. 
Mississippi 




“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 53 percent 
Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 71 percent (Upper limit of 95 percent confidence interval: 76 
percent) 
DoD contract obligations performed in Mississippi significantly outperformed their “estimated” effective 
competition rates. A disproportionately large share (42 percent) of contract obligations performed in 
Mississippi in 2014 were related to Ships platforms, primarily related to construction of DDG-51 
destroyers at Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi, owned by Huntington Ingalls Industries. 
Nearly three-quarters of Ships obligations was awarded after effective competition (almost entirely with 
only 2 offers,) compared to 28 percent for DoD overall. Approximately 30 percent of contract obligations 
performed in Mississippi were related to Aircraft programs, which generally have low levels of effective 
competition, due to the limited industrial base for aircraft platforms, the long-term nature of aircraft 
programs, and the tendency for maintenance contracts to be performed by the 
development/production vendor. But the contract obligations in Mississippi, mainly for “maintenance–
repair of aircraft,”40 were highly competitive, with nearly three-quarters awarded after effective 
competition, compared to 11 percent for DoD overall. 
Alabama 
Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $8.8 billion 
“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 56 percent 
Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 82 percent (Upper limit of 95 percent confidence interval: 80 
percent) 
DoD contract obligations performed in Alabama greatly exceeded their “estimated” effective 
competition rate in 2014, surpassing the upper limit of the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
prediction. This is primarily a result of the fact that, for nearly every major category in the portfolio of 
contracts performed in Alabama, the rate of effective competition is notably higher than for overall 
DoD. The ERS and PAMS services categories, the Ships products category, and R&D all saw rates of 
effective competition at least 25 percentage points higher than the overall DoD rate. 
For ERS, which accounted for 12 percent of contract obligations awarded in Alabama, 98 percent were 
awarded after effective competition, compared to 56 percent for DoD overall. For PAMS, which 
accounted for 33 percent of contract obligations performed in Alabama, 83 percent were awarded after 
effective competition, compared to 58 percent for DoD overall. R&D contract obligations, which made 
up 21 percent of contract obligations performed in Alabama, saw 87 percent awarded after effective 
competition, compared to 46 percent for DoD overall. And the effective competition rate for Ships, 
which accounted for 9 percent of contract obligations performed in Alabama, saw a 100 percent 
effective competition rate, compared to 28 percent for DoD overall. 
                                                          




As with Massachusetts, the degree to which nearly every major category across the spectrum of 
contracts performed in Alabama saw higher-than-average rates of effective competition account for the 
difficulty the model had in generating an accurate prediction.  
Washington 
Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $7.5 billion 
“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 27 percent 
Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 45 percent (Upper limit of 95 percent confidence interval: 52 
percent) 
DoD contract obligations performed in Washington state significantly over-performed their “estimated” 
effective competition rates in 2014, primarily due to higher-than-average rates of effective competition 
for contracts related to Aircraft programs and contracts for facilities-related services & construction. 
As would be expected from the home state of Boeing, a high share (66 percent) of obligations for 
contracts performed in Washington go to Aircraft & Drones programs. The source of the higher-than-
“estimated“ rate of competition for contracts performed in Washington appears to be a higher-than-
average rate of competition for Aircraft-related products: while only 10 percent of contract obligations 
for DoD overall were awarded after effective competition in 2014, 35 percent of those contracts 
performed in Washington were awarded after effective competition.41  
FRS&C also makes up a significant share of contracts performed in Washington, and the data show a 
highly competitive market: 88 percent of Washington FRS&C contract obligations were awarded after 
effective competition in 2014, compared to 70 percent for DoD overall. And nearly 90 percent of the 
effectively competed FRS&C contracts performed in Washington received three or more offers. 
Virginia 
Total 2014 Contract Obligations: $33.6 billion 
“Estimated” 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 59 percent 
Actual 2014 Effective Competition Rate: 55 percent  
Despite a higher-than-average rate of effective competition for a category of services that makes up a 
significant share of contract obligations performed in Virginia, the predictive model was able to almost 
exactly predict Virginia’s effective competition rate for 2014. 
A key reason why the model was able to accurately predict the 2014 effective competition rate for 
contract obligations performed in Virginia was that the characteristics of those contracts line up notably 
                                                          
41 Due to poor data labeling, the competed portion of Washington’s Aircraft contract obligations are labeled as 
being associated with the Shillelagh Missile, a 1970s Army anti-tank missile program. CSIS is engaging with experts 




with those characteristics that have significant explanatory power under the state predictive model. 
Contact obligations performed in Virginia are disproportionately awarded for services and under IDV 
contract types, which correlate with higher rates of effective competition, and are disproportionally 
awarded for PAMS and the Aircraft and Drones platform portfolio, which correlate with lower levels of 
effective competition. 
As might be expected given the volume of available vendors, the market for PAMS in Virginia is 
significantly more competitive than it is nationwide: 61 percent of PAMS contract obligations performed 
in Virginia were awarded after effective competition, compared to 36 percent nationwide.  
It is also notable that, for R&D contract obligations performed in Virginia, 36 percent awarded after 
competitions received only a single offer—over twice the rate for R&D nationwide. As a result, the rate 
of effective competition for R&D contracts performed in Virginia was only 32 percent in 2014, compared 
to 46 percent nationwide. Given the heavy concentration of major R&D vendors in Virginia, this high 






V. Results and Final Thoughts 
Due to the previously mentioned limitations inherent in this iteration of the model, it bears repeating 
that the results from the predictive model are not intended to be used to “grade” states and MCCs on 
their performance in promoting effective competition. For MCCs, the “estimated” effective competition 
rates for 2014 were off by an average of 15 percentage points, with a median of 10 percentage points; 
when only MCCs with over $1 billion are looked at, however, the mean difference was 9 percentage 
points, with a median of 6 percentage points. For states, the predictive model was notably more 
accurate—the mean differential between actual and “estimated” 2014 effective competition rates for 
states was 8 percentage points, with a median of 7 percentage points. Interestingly, the mean and 
median differentials for states with over $1 billion in obligations are slightly higher (9 percent mean, 8 
percent median), indicating that the model for states has less of an issue with low levels of obligations 
than does the MCC model. 
There are other statistical techniques that could be used to try and generate more accurate predictions, 
but some of the significant challenges that the study team had to deal with in this research effort would 
also apply to those other approaches. Most notably, there is an issue of causality when using variables 
based on what is being contracted for delivery: the specific mix of product, services, and R&D within a 
state or MCC is a decision made at a much higher level than decisions on contract pricing mechanism or 
contract vehicle. Any future attempts to develop a predictive model for defense competition will have to 
account for that potential limiting factor. 
Regardless of the limitations of the predictive models, the results validate the ability of the models to 
identify states and MCCs where rates of effective competition for a segment of the contracting portfolio 
differ significantly from the rates for overall DoD. For states in particular, this method of analysis can 
serve as a complement to, and potential cueing system for, the highly detailed S2T2 industrial base 
assessment. While that analysis took a micro-level approach to the industrial base, this analysis is more 
of a macro-level view, allowing an assessment of whether particular states have lower-than-average 
rates of effective competition for particular portions of their defense contract portfolios. For instance, as 
discussed earlier in the “Examination of Outlier Major Commands and U.S. States” section, contracts 
performed in Massachusetts see rates of effective competition well below average in most significant 
categories. One explanation for this could be that the particular types of, for example, PAMS performed 
in Massachusetts historically had lower rates of effective competition than did overall PAMS. This 
explanation, however, seems unlikely to account for how broadly contracts performed in states like 
Massachusetts under- (or over-) perform typical rates of effective competition. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the MCC data in this analysis is that, if DoD has any hope of 
promoting effective competition in contracting, policymakers will have to look beyond policies that 
focus on competition as a DoD-wide phenomenon, or even as an issue at the major component level. 
Rather, the data indicate that the major discrepancies in rates of effective competition are at the MCC 
level, or even further down at the contracting office level. As with states, there may be legitimate 
factors relating to the exact composition of what an MCC contracts for that influence their rates of 




some of those differences between MCCs are the result of certain MCCs being better or worse at getting 
competition for their contracting portfolios. Identifying which MCCs are getting higher- or lower-than-
average rates of effective competition for particular categories of contracts can be the first step to 
identifying best practices and areas for potential improvement. 
The CSIS study team will continue to track and investigate trends in competition for defense contracts as 
part of an ongoing effort to inform the public debate with hard data. As part of this ongoing effort, CSIS 
is making key elements of the methodology of both this research effort and the broader contracting 
analysis available to other researchers at http://github.com/CSiSdefense. The study team is happy to 
collaborate with other researchers and interested parties, whether in government or outside, in order to 
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AK              1.49  72% 81% -8% 
AL              8.81  82% 56% 26% 
AR              0.60  78% 79% -1% 
AS              0.00  89% 96% -7% 
AZ              9.57  18% 25% -6% 
CA             30.59  50% 48% 2% 
CO              5.76  38% 62% -23% 
CT             13.21  6% 24% -19% 
DC              4.19  58% 61% -3% 
DE              0.40  80% 87% -7% 
FL              9.73  52% 52% 0% 
GA              6.32  34% 33% 1% 
GU              0.73  92% 87% 5% 
HI              2.13  72% 83% -11% 
IA              1.10  33% 29% 4% 
ID              0.16  77% 75% 2% 
IL              4.29  61% 51% 9% 
IN              2.46  41% 50% -9% 
KS              1.55  46% 54% -8% 
KY              5.97  88% 83% 5% 




 2014 Contract 
Obligations 











MA              9.43  19% 38% -19% 
MD             12.94  56% 56% 0% 
ME              1.42  63% 54% 10% 
MI              2.43  32% 42% -9% 
MN              3.85  89% 93% -3% 
MO              7.02  29% 34% -5% 
MP              0.00  49% 39% 10% 
MS              2.27  71% 53% 18% 
MT              0.20  57% 63% -6% 
NC              2.49  79% 75% 4% 
ND              0.22  88% 88% 0% 




NH              1.13  35% 45% -11% 
NJ              5.53  52% 41% 11% 
NM              1.26  69% 59% 10% 
NV              1.27  41% 58% -17% 
NY              6.22  32% 35% -3% 
OH              4.49  67% 53% 14% 
OK              1.83  59% 69% -9% 
OR              0.57  54% 60% -7% 
PA             10.15  59% 46% 13% 
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RI              0.82  52% 54% -2% 
SC              2.74  66% 68% -2% 
SD              0.12  51% 58% -7% 
TN              1.17  75% 56% 18% 
TX             23.56  39% 38% 2% 
UT              1.53  52% 54% -2% 
VA             33.59  55% 59% -4% 
VI              0.00  44% 73% -29% 
VT              0.15  29% 32% -3% 
WA              7.52  45% 27% 18% 
WI              1.28  65% 65% -1% 
WV              0.24  73% 62% 12% 


























ACC              1.81  77% 64% 14% 
AETC              1.49  69% 66% 3% 
AF INSTALLATION 
CONTRACTING AGENCY              2.97  70% 77% -7% 
AFDW              0.38  42% 64% -21% 
AFGSC              0.27  70% 69% 2% 
AFISRA              0.20  35% 69% -34% 
AFMC            37.43  30% 33% -3% 
AFOTEC              0.02  34% 78% -44% 
AFRC              0.23  73% 63% 9% 
AFSOC              0.19  72% 59% 13% 
AFSPC              8.43  36% 63% -26% 
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND              1.03  68% 64% 4% 
ARMY MATERIEL 
COMMAND            49.58  46% 34% 12% 
ATEC            (0.00) 1% 41% -40% 
CONSTRUCTION & 
EQUIPMENT              2.46  90% 76% 14% 
DCMA, HQ, PROCUREMENT 
CENTER              0.11  44% 52% -8% 
DCSO              0.94  62% 51% 11% 
DLA AVIATION              4.44  20% 25% -5% 
DLA DISPOSITION SERVICES              0.10  84% 90% -7% 




















DLA DOCUMENT SERVICES              0.09  71% 59% 13% 
DLA ENERGY            12.48  94% 88% 6% 
DLA LAND              1.27  46% 25% 21% 
DLA LOGISTICS 
INFORMATION SERVICE              0.06  8% 91% -83% 
DLA MARITIME              1.89  53% 52% 1% 




DLA TROOP SUPT C&T              1.19  62% 88% -26% 
DLA TROOP SUPT MED              4.70  96% 91% 5% 
DLA TROOP SUPT SUB              2.10  89% 90% -1% 
INSCOM              0.72  67% 62% 5% 
MEDCOM              1.34  58% 75% -17% 
MSC              1.76  83% 69% 14% 
NAVAIR            24.84  17% 15% 2% 
NAVFAC              8.24  79% 67% 12% 
NAVSEA            29.86  35% 35% -1% 
NAVSUP              7.67  33% 51% -18% 
NGB              2.18  66% 60% 6% 
ONR              1.29  59% 65% -6% 
PACAF              0.76  54% 64% -10% 
PEO STRI ORLANDO              1.92  85% 83% 1% 




















SPAWAR              5.20  57% 61% -4% 
SSP              2.39  4% 20% -17% 
Uncategorized            35.46  71% 67% 4% 
USACE            17.24  81% 67% 14% 
USAFA              0.15  80% 66% 14% 
USAFE              0.44  89% 58% 31% 
USAMRAA              1.24  55% 59% -5% 
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